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A STRATEGIC ALTROISM MODEL  IN WHICH  RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE DOES  NOT  HOLD 
ABSTRACT 
This article demonstrates that Ricardian Equivalence does not 
necessarily hold in  models with altruistic transfers once one takes into 
account the strategic behavior of recipients as well as donors.  To influence 
the final allocation of  consumption in altruistic settings, potential 
recipients can threaten to refuse as well as accept transfers. 
We  apply the  Extended Nash Bargaining Solution to the problem of  an 
altruistic parent and a  possibly altruistic child.  The parent and child 
first choose a threat  point noncooperatively; this threat point then 
influences the final allocation of consumption through the standard Nash 
Bargaining Solution,  While the potential recipient can refuse transfers from 
the potential donor, he cannot refuse transfers from the government.  When 
the golrernrnenr redistributes between the parent and  child, it  changes their 
endowments and the equilibrium threats,  and thus the final allocation of 
onsuaption. 
The feature of  the cooperative model presented here that leads to the 
failure of Ricardian Equivalence  may be characteristic of a wider class of 
cooperative and noncooperative altruism models.  This feature is that non- 
interior strategic postures underlie interior transfer behavior and that 
these non-  interior strategic postures are altered  by  government 
redistribution. 
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I.  Introduction 
It is now 15 yesrs  since Robert  Barro  (1974) wrote  his ingenious  article 
showing how love of  children  (intergenerational  altruism)  can economically 
link  current  and future generations  and thereby neutralize  intergenerational 
redistribution  by the government  (Ricardian  Equivalence).  During  this time 
the Barro model,  despite its critics, has taken  its place  wIth the Keynesian 
and Life Cycle models  aa a principal  paradigm  of saving and growth.  Several 
critics have pointed out reasons why the requirement  for Ricardian  Equivalence 
of interior  transfers  may not be satisfied  (e.g., Barro,  1974;  Drazen,  1978; 
L.aitner.  l979a,  1979b, 1988  and Feidstein,  1988).  Others  (Kotlikoff,  1983 and 
Sernheim  and Bagweil.  1984)  have cast doubt on the model by showing how 
intermarriage  c.toas  Barro dynasties  can lead  to incredibly  large  groups of 
intrageneratlonally  linked ndividuala, redistribution  among whom  will also he 
neutralized. 
None of the critics has, however,  questioned  whether  Ricardian 
quivalence necessarily  follows  from  the basic  elements  in  Barro'a study. 
This article  does  lust that.  It  examines  the strategic  game between  an 
altruistic  parent  and a possibly  altruiatic  child and shows,  under  the 
Extended  Nash  Bargaining  Solution1,  that  Ricardian  Equivalence  will  almost 
never hold.  The Extended  Nash Bargaining  Solution  is simply  the standard  Nash 
Bargaining  Solution  extended  to permit  its threat  (disagreement)  point  to be 
determined  endogenously  as an equilibrium  of  a noncooperative  game  of threat— 
strategy  selection.  This noncooperative  game is played  prior  to the Nash 
bargaining  game,  and the equilibrium  threats  in our setting  turn  out to be the —2— 
players'  initial endowments.  When the government  redistributes,  it  changes 
each  player's  endowment  and, therefore,  the equilibrium  of the threat  game. 
Since  the bargaining  solution depends on the equilibrium  of the threat  game, 
government  redistribution,  in  general, changes  the outcome of  the bargaining 
game. 
Barro  does not make explicit  the game he  models  between an altruistic 
parent  and child, but in  his formulation  the child appears  to be quite  passive 
and simply  takes whatever  transfer  is given.  There  is no  scope  for the child 
to  manipulate  the parent  by threatening  to refuse  transfers  that  are below a 
specified  level and\or by threatening  to  transfer  funds to the parent  if  the 
parent  is not sufficiently  generous.  Stated  differently,  there  is no scope 
for strategies  associated  with statements  such as "If that's  the best  you can 
do, forget  it."  The apparent restrictions  on  the actions  of children  in  the 
Barro  model become  more apparent  if  parents  not only  love  (are altruistic  with 
respect  to) their children,  but children  love (are  altruistic  with respect  to) 
their parents.  While  parents and children may care for each  other,  they are 
unlikely  to agree on the exact  net amount  to be transferred between  them.  For 
families with reciprocal  altruism  (presumably most families)  the problem  than 
is one of competing  altruism  in  which parents may be trying  to transfer  to 
their  children  at the same  time that the chLldren  are trying to transfer  to 
their  parents.  In such  a setting the assumption  that  each  player  simply 
accepts whatever  is offered  seems unrealistic.  Individuals  seem  equally 
empowered  both to make  and to refuse  gifts.2 
The next section,  II,  computes  the Extended  Nash  Eargaining  Solution  to a 
game involving  a parent  and  child, at least one of whom is altruistic  toward —3.— 
the other.  Section  lI  shows why the solution  will almost  never be neutral 
with respect  to government  redistribution  between  the two players.  Section  LV 
discusses  the differences  between cooperative  and noncooperative  solutions  to 
this game and suggests  a way of  distinguishing  empirically  between the  two. 
Section V concludes  and presents  ideas  for future research  that would expand 
on  the framework  presented  here. 
II.  The Exten  isajnSoltiOn  in a Two—Person  Aruism  ame 
There  are two stages  in  the Extended Nash Sargaining  Solution  to this 
- 
altruism  game.  In the second stage  the players agree  to aaxmize  the product 
of their utility  gains relative  to the respective  values  of utility at the 
threat point.3  From this maximization  one can compute  the indirect utility of 
each  player  as a function  of  the threat point,  In  the firat stage  the players 
choose  threat  strategies  noncooperatively.  The payoffs  in this stage  are the 
indirect utilities  for t:e point  resulting from  any pair  of threat  strategies. 
Any noncooperative  (Nash) equilibrium of this first stage  game  generates, 
therefore,  a Pareto optimum  in  the second  stage.  It is well  known (see, e.g. 
Kalai  and  Rosenthal,  1978)  that all equilibria  in the.  first—stage  game are 
equivalent  in  the sense that  they  produce the same  second—stage  bargain. 
The Second  Stage 




stand for the utility  functions  of  the parent and 
child,  respectively.  Their arguments,  C 
and Ck.  are the respective 
consumptions  of  the parent  and  child..  The terms  and  stand for the —4-- 
respective  threat—point  utilities  of the parent and child, which  are constants 
in  this stage. 
(1)  N(C,Ck) 
— [V(C,Ck) 
— V]  [Vk(CkCp) 
— 
Vk] 
To keep matters  simple we assume  that V( 
,  )  and  Vk(  )  are of the 
forms: 
(2)  V(C, Ck) 
— u(C) +  w(Ck) 
(3)  Vk(Ck, C)  — 
m(Ck)  + n(C) 
where  the functions  u(  ), w(  ), m(  ),  and  n( )  are continuously 
differentiable,  increasing,  and concave.4 
The expression  for N is maximized  subject to  the collective  parent—and— 
child budget  constraint: 
(4)  CP+Ck_Ep+E 
where E 
and Ek are the endowments  of  the parent  and child,  respectively,  and 
subject  to the constraint  that  both  factors in brackets  on the right—hand  side 
of (1) be nonnegative.  Any solution  to this maximization  problem  satisfies: 
(5)  [u (C)  — v  (Ck)][m(Ck) 
+ n(C)  — 
Vk] 
+ [m  (Ck) 
— n (C)][u(C)  + 
w(Ck) 
—  — 
There are two different  ways equation  (5) could  be satisfied.  One way is for 
both terms in (5) to be zero (i.e., at  least one of the factors  of each term 
to be zero).  This can  occur,  for instance, if both  parent  and child remain  at —5— 
the threat  point  or if the factors  involving derivatives  are both  zero.  The 
second  way is for the ratio of aV(CE—C)/oC 
(the  first factor  in square 
brackets  in (5)) to aVk(E—CpCp)/âCp 
to equal minus the ratio of the parent's 
utility  gain  to the child's utility  gain. 
Figure  1 depicts V(GE—C) 
and  Vk(Ck,E—Ck)  under the aasumptions that: 
1) u'  (0) — w1  (0) — a'  (0)  — n' (0)  and ii) x > y where x and y  are defined 
by  u'(x)—w'(E—x)  and n'(y)—m'(E—y).  ln  the Figure,  Ck is measured  from left 
to right  on  the horizontal  axis  and C 
from  right  to left,  their sum  being 
fixed at  E.  The first assumption  ensures that the parent's and child's  sost 
preferred  allocations  (their respective  bliss points)  lie between  0 and E on 
the horizontal  axis.  The second  assumption  ensures  that the parent's 
child's) bliss  point  involves more  consumption by the parent (child)  than 
does the childs  (parent's) bliss  point.  Points  A and B indicate allocations 
corresponding  to the bliss points of the parent and child,  respectively,  Any 
allocation  lying  between  points A and B, such  as  Z, is a Pareto—optimal 
allocation. 
As described  below,  the first—stage  game leads  to the determination  of a 
threat—point  allocation  on  the horizontal  axis.  The threat  values of the 
parent's  and child's utility, V 
and 
11k'  correspond  to the values of V( 
, 
and  Vk( 
,  )  evaluated at this threat—point allocation.  If the result  of the 
first—stage  game  is a threat allocation  such as Z that lies between A and B, 
the solution  to the second  stage is for the players  to consume  the allocation 
Z.  This  is a simple  consequence of Pareto optimality  and corresponds  to the 
first  instance of the first  type of  solution to equation  (5).  In contrast,  if 
the first—stage  game  leads  to a threat  allocation  to the right  of B or to the —6— 
Left of A,  such as R, N can be increased beyond  the value  obtained by 
consuming  the allocation  R.  The solution in this case  occurs at  point  D, 
where the ratio of the slope  of V 
to that  of Vk equals  minus  the ratio  of the 
parent's  utility gain to the child's utility  gain.  (The point  D necessarily 
lies between points A and B because  to the left of A snd to  the right of B the 
slopes of VP 
and Vk have the same sign, making  their ratio nonnegative.)  Note 
that the point D resulting  from R is uniquely  determined:  Between A and B the 
absolute  value of the ratio  of  the slopes  increases  in Ck, while  the ratio  of 
the utility gains falls. 
- 
In the case that the parent's bliss  point  lies to rhe right of the 
child's  bliss point,  threat—point  allocations  lying between  the two bliss 
points  will again be decisive  in  that each  player  will  consume  at  the threat.. 
point allocation.  For points  to the left of  the child's bliss  point  and to 
the right  of the parent's  bliss  point the bargaining  solution  will again map 
to a point between the two bliss  points.  In the case that the child  does noc 
care  about the parent (n(C)—O violating  assumption  i)), the graph 
corresponding  to Figure  1 is similar except  that Vk rises monotonically 
between  CkO  and ckE. 
In the case that the two bliss roints  coincide  there is nniy one Pare'i-, 
optimum  (at the coincident  bliss points), and the solution  tc  (5)  involves. 
both derivative  factors being  zero. 
The First Stage 
An  important  feature of  the second—stage  gsme is that  it :esults in a 
Pareto  optimUm  to repeat,  iTt  tettis of Figure  lç  final conauetttion  must lie —7— 
between  A and B.  If  the threat  lies between A and  B,  consumption  occurs  at 
that  point; and if the threat point lies to the left  of A or to the right of 
B, the parent  and child  bargain  to a point between A and  B. 
We model  the first—stage game strategies  for the parent  and child  aa 
choices of how much to offer each  other  and how much to accept from  each 
other.  These  should  be thought of as maximums  in all cases;  for instance,  if 
the parent  offers a and accepts fl  while  the child offers  -y  and accepts  6, 
then  min(m,8)  — min(fl,-y)  is the net transfer from  parent  to child.  Since the 
two players  start out with  the total endowment  and  nothing  is wasted,  the 
result  of  the first—stage  gsme is simply  s reallocation  (here representable  as 
a point  on the horizontaL  axis in Figure 1). 
The solution n the first stage  game is quite simple.  The  equilibrium 
chrest—point i.iocation always  turns out  to be just the point of initial 
endowments of the players.  To see this suppose first that the initial 
endowment  lies between  points A and B in  Figure  1.  This  allocation  is Pareto 
optimal, hence any threat—point reallocation  will result in  more utility  for 
Dne player  and less for the other.  Since both  players  can enforce  the 
endowment  point  by offering nothing  snd accepting nothing,  this must  be an 
equilibrium.  Next  suppose  the initial endowment  lies  to the left  of point A 
or to  the right  of  point B.  If the threat—point  allocation  in this case is 
just this endowment  point,  the two players bargain  in  the second  stage  to a 
Pareto  optimum,  corresponding  to a point  that lies between  A and  B.  If  the 
threat—point  allocation  differs from the endowment  point,  the second—stage 
solution  is again  Pareto optimal  and, therefore,  involves higher  utility  for 
one player  and lower utility  for the other  than the second—stage  solution —8— 
arising  from  the endowment  threat.  Hence,  as before,  one player  will resist 
any change  in  the threat point, and the endowment  is an  equilibrium. 
III.  The Failure of  Ricardian  Equivalence 
Ricardian  Equivalence  means  that if  there  is a positive  net transfer  from 
the parent  (child) to  the child (parent) both  before  and after  the 
government's  redistribution,  the private transfer  will  be changed  such  that 
the government's  redistribution  has no real consequences.  This property 
almost  never  holds  for the model  considered  here.  To  see this examine  again 
Figure  1.  For there to be a positive net transfer from  one player  to the 
other both  before  and after  the government's  redistribution,  the endowment 
must either  lie initially  to the left of point  A-and  remain to the left of 
point  A or  lie initially  to  the right of point  B and  remain  to the right  of 
point  B.  A  government  redistribution  that  leaves  the endowment  to the left  of 
point A  or leaves  the endowment  to the right  of  point B, while it leaves 
unchanged  the direction  of the bargained  net transfer, will,  nonetheless, 
change  the threat point  in  stage  1 and, therefore,  the solution. 
In the Figure, government  redistribution  from  the parent  to the child 
that moves the endowment  point, and therefore  the threat point,  from  point R 
to point  Q moves  the solution  from  point  D to point  J.  In  the Figure, point  J 
lies  to the right  of D (though it need  not in  general).  Hence,  the government 
policy  is successful  in increasing both the consumption  and welfare  of the 
child;  i.e.,  in  this example,  private transfers  do not fully  offset  the 
government's  transfers. 
Private  transfers may. however,  more than  fully offset  government 
redistribution.  As an  example,  if  the government  redistributes  from  the —9— 
parent  to  the child  by moving  the endowment  from point R to point  M, the 
solution  will move from point  D to a point  between A and C.  The solution  must 
lie to the left  of C because  to the right of C the parent  is made  worse off 
than remaining  at the threat point K.  Compared with  point 0, a solution  to 
the left of  point C involves smaller  net transfers to the child;  i.e.  private 
transfers  more than offset  the government's  transfers.  From the Figure  it is 
clear  that,  in general,  if the government  redistributes  enough  to the net 
recipient  of  private  transfers,  but not so much  as to move the endowment  point 
into the region  between A and B,  the private  response will  more than  offset 
the government  policy.  Thus,  if the government  takes  sway too much  of the net 
transferee's  bargaining  leverage,  the net transferee  will  definitely  end up 
worse  off. 
There can be isolated  instances where  the government's  transfer  is 
exactly  offset; here Ricardian  Equivalence  holds.  Also in  the case  A—B the 
unique  Pareto—optimal  allocation  is the solution  in  the second stage  no matter 
what transfers  occur;  hence,  for this case Ricardian  Equivalence  holds. 
IV.  Comoaring  the, Extended  Nash  Bsrpaininz  Solution to the Noncooperative 
Equilibrium 
In contrast  to the Extended  Nash Solution,  the noncooperative  equilibrium 
in this same static  framework  does exhibit Ricardian  Equivalence.5  In the 
noncooperative  equilibrium  each player  takes  the other player's  maximum  offer 
and acceptance  as given  and chooses his best  response.  In terms of Figure  1 
if the endowment  point  lies between  points A and  B,  the only  noncooperative 
equilibrium  is the same as the cooperative  solution,  resulting  in each  player —10— 
consuming  his endowment.  In this region the issue of Ricardian  Equivalence 
does not arise as there are no transfers before  or  after  the government's 
redistribution.  If the endowment  lies to the left  of point  A the following 
describes  all the equilibria:  The parent  offers  to transfer just enough  funds 
to  the child  to move the allocation  to the parent's bliss  point  A and the 
parent  accepts nothing.  The child offers  nothing and accepts  the amount  of 
the parent's  offer  (or more).  The same  reasoning  indicates  that if the 
endowment  point  lies to the right  of  point B, all the noncooperative 
equilibria  require  the child to transfer an amount  sufficient  to move the 
allocation  to point  B and for the parent  to accept  this transfer,  Starting 
from  endowments  to  the left  of  A (or to the right  of  B), government 
redistribution  that keeps  the endowment  to  the left  of A (or to the right of 
B) leaves unchanged  the equilibrium  outcome.  The players  still move to the 
same  bliss  point with the same utility  payoffs.  Here Ricardian  Equivalence 
holds. 
One might  argue  that the noncooperative  solution  is more  plausible  than 
the cooperative  solution.  Rather  than  agree to play the cooperative  game, why 
doesn't  the potential  net transferor  simply  call the other player's  bluff. 
For example,  if  the endowment  lies to the left  of point  A, why doesn't  the 
parent  simply  tell the child  "take  it  or leave  it," and why doesn't  the chti 
simply  take it.  One answer  is that  since  the child  knows the parent's 
altruistic  utility,  the child  calls  the parent's bluff.  This assumes  the 
parent  has no last—mover  advantage  (but we have  been abstracting  from  the fine 
details  of  the bargaining  process  throughout;  see Section V). 
Another  answer  may  be that the child  cares  about  the bargaining  procea 
as well as the outcome.  If  the child feels he is being  toLd tek.e  it or le' —11— 
it," he may leave  it because he resents being  treated in that  manner.  The 
child  may also  feel a loss of  pride  in  accepting  a transfer,  so  the transfer 
may need to be conveyed  to the child  in a manner  that preserves  the child's 
pride.  Maintenance  of  the child's pride may require the parent  to  pursue 
cooperative  bargaining.  In the cooperative  game modeled  here the parent  and 
child know 1)  that they  are going  to meet  and try to work  out a transfer 
arrangement  and  2)  that if they  don't  reach an  agreement  they  will end up 
consuming  what they brought  into the meeting.  The issue of  pride may not onl 
require  that they meet,  it may also enforce the post—meeting  threat;  i.e.  ,  th 
threat,  if  the meeting  breaks  down  to consume only  what one brought  into the 
meeting,  may be credible  if  there  is loss in  pride associated  with giving  in 
after  threatening  not to give in. 
A usual  argument  favoring  cooperative  rules  (i.e.  ,  that binding 
agreements  are possible)  is the objective  of  making  Pareto  improvements  over 
non—optimal  outcomes.  In the model presented  here,  however,  the 
noncooperative  equilibria  happen  to be Pareto  optimal,  so Pareto  improvementE 
do not justify  the cooperative  solution.  However,  extensions  of the model 
lead  to  cases  in which  the noncooperative  equilibrium  is not Pareto  optimal. 
As an example,  take the case in  which  the parent has two children  each  of wh 
cares  about  the parent, but who are not altruistic  toward  each other.  Also 
suppose that the parent  is not altruistic  toward the children.  In  this case 
the noncooperative  equilibrium,  if it involves both  children  transferring  to 
the parent,  will  not be Pareto optimal  (see Nerlove,  Razin,  Sadka,  1984).  I 
uaking  thair  transfers  to the parent, each child ignores the external benefi 
to the other.  As a consequence,  the noncooperative  equilibrium  involves  too 
little  being transferred  to  the parent. —12-— 
One way to test empirically  the cooperative  model  against the 
noncooperative  model  is to determine  whether  the distribution  of consumption 
among family  members who are partiea to net transfers depends  on the 
distribution  of initial resources  among  these members,  For example,  suppose 
one had  a  sample  of parents each  transferring  to his  child,  According to the 
cooperative  model  presented here,  the distribution of endowments batween  the 
parent and child  will affect  the distribution  of consumption  tatween  the 
parent and child.  Such is not the case  in the  noncooparative nodal. 
V,  Ideas for Future Reaearth  and Cnuctusior. 
This article demonstrates  that Ricardian  tc;chzaienca  does not necassa 
hold  in  models with  altruistic  transfers  once one takes into  account  the 
strategic  behavior  of  recipients  as 'coil  boncas.  The model  we have oath 
make thispoint is, however,  static  and  ;oioitlv  stylized.  It does  not take 
into account  that parents  and chilbzeo  can bargain over  many  perioda  and that 
their bargaining  positions  may depati  cc.  their life expectancies.  It also 
takes  a particular  view  of both ho bargaining  process  and the strategies 
available  to the players  (althoooh acre realistic  alternatives  are not 
obvious).  Finally,  it does not consider how the bargaining  nutcome  is 
affected  by the presence  of more  than  one child  and/or mora than  one parent. 
Specifying  alternative  noncooperative  and cooperative  strategic—altruism 
models  in  finer detail may represent  a fruitful  line of  research.  We suspect 
that for the most  part  such  models  will  not, however,  satisfy  Ricardian 
Equivalence  because,  as in  the cooperative  model of this paper,  interior 
transfers  can result fromnon—interior  strategic postures  and  because  non— —13— 
interior  strategies  (e.g., accepting  nothing)  are likely  to be aspects of 
equilibria. —14— 
Notes 
I  Nash (1953).  See also Luce and Raiffa  (1957) Chapter 6 for a suismary  with 
critical comments. 
2  Abel (1987) and  Kimball  (1987) rule out the refusal  of  gifts a  priori.  In 
their  analyses of "two way"  altruism  they develop conditions  on  preferences 
that  will,  in  part,  ensure  that transfers are never tofusad in a 
noncooperative  game in which  each  player  chooses  transfers  taking  the 
tranriers  of  others as given. 
3  There  is an  extensive  literature  beginning  with  Nash ci950) justifying  the 
product—of—the—utility  gains  solution,  See Roth (1979)  for a recent  suruey, 
:7  These  forms  for the utility  functions 1( 
,  )  and Vk  ,  )  are consistent 
with the psrent  (the  child)  csring about his  own  :onsuoiption  and the utility 
of the child  (the parent).  For  example,  use  (2)  to write  the  following 
expression:  Ck 
— m'(Vk 
—  n(C)).  The.  insertj,oo  f  this expression into  (2) 
yields  Vp(CpCk) 
— Hp(CpVk) 
—  u(C)  + a(rn(V0 
5.  Noncooperative  models  are examined  Htunicnael (1982), Burbridge  (1983) 
Neil  (987), Abel (1987), and Kimball  *2) —15— 
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